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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v.
MARTIN LINEN SUPPLY COMPANY AND
TEXAS SANITARY TOWEL SUPPLY CORPORATION
(Docket No. 76-120)
Double jeopardy-Right of the Government to appeal a
court's judgment of acquittal following a jury mistrial in a
criminal case
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. Decision below: 534 F.2d 585 (1976).
Argument scheduled for the week of February 22, 1977
Analysis prepared February 4, 1977, by Patrick Charles McGinley, Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University
College of Law, 211 Law Center, Morgantown, WV 26506;
telephone (304) 293-5301
Issue
Does the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution
bar a government appeal of a judgment of acquittal entered by
the court where the jury was unable to reach a verdict and a
mistrial had been declared?
Facts
In 1969, the United States Department of Justice brought
an antitrust action against two commonly-owned Texas firms,
Martin Linen Supply Company and Texas Sanitary Towel
Supply Company, and their president, William B. Troy, alleging that certain of their business practices constituted unlawful
restraints of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The case
was settled by the entry of a consent decree agreed to by all
of the parties, in the United States District Court in San
Antonio. The consent decree required the defendants to refrain from certain business practices that might result in a
restraint of trade.
In December 1971, attorneys for the United States Department of Justice filed civil and criminal contempt petitions in
the United States District Court in San Antonio against Troy
and the linen supply companies, alleging that they had violated the 1969 consent decree. The Government alleged that

the defendants had threatened their competitors with economic reprisals to induce them not to furnish linen supplies
to certain customers whose patronage was also sought by
defendants. The district court dismissed the petitions, but, on
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for a trial to be held to
determine the merits of the government's claims.
In February 1975, the criminal contempt trial was held in
San Antonio. (The civil contempt petition was not a part of
the criminal proceedings and has not yet been tried.) The jury
acquitted Troy, the firm's president, but deadlocked 11-I in
favor of conviction of the defendant firms. In declaring a
mistrial as to the two companies, Judge John H. Wood, Jr.,
stated that "I have seen some contempt cases, but this is without a doubt the weakest I have ever seen." Several days later,
the companies made a motion for acquittal pursuant to Rule
29(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule
allows a trial judge to set aside a jury verdict of guilty and
enter a judgment of acquittal; the trial judge may also enter a
judgment of acquittal after a trial has ended with a deadlocked jury. The rule allows a trial court to avoid a miscarriage
of justice that would result, for example, if the prosecution
has failed to prove its case or if the jury has erroneously
entered a guilty verdict although the evidence did not warrant
such a result.
The trial judge reviewed the evidence presented at the trial
and concluded that the Government failed to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, pursuant to Rule 29(c), the
court entered a judgment of acquittal as to both companies.
The Government appealed and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the double jeopardy
clause of the Constitution barred the government's appeal.
Background and Significance
The significance of this case lies largely in what the result
will indicate as to the Burger Court's trend toward broadening
prosecutorial powers while limiting the scope of constitutional
protection afforded criminal defendants. The fifth amendment
to the Constitution of the United States provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
Continued on page 2
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jeopardy of life and limb." This double jeopardy clause was
intended to prevent the Government from maintaining burdensome piecemeal or rdpetitiouvcrminal prosecutions based on
the same charge. The Supreme Court has indicated on numerous occasions that the, Govrnment with all of its resources
and power should not be lowed to make repeated attempts
to convict an individ utl0of 'an alleged offense, thus subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense, and--ordeal, and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as increasing the possibility that he may be found guilty
although he is innocent.
In the last decade, a rising tide of public concern over an
ever increasing crime rate resulted in the enactment of a number of important pieces of federal legislation, including the
Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 (hereafter "Act"). The
Act contains a provision that removed previously imposed
strict statutory restraints upon the government's right to appeal
in criminal cases. 18 U.S.C. §3731. Apparently the intent of
Congress in enacting this provision was to make the right of
appeal as broad as the double jeopardy clause would permit.
Prior to the passage of the Act, the Supreme Court had not
been given an opportunity to establish the precise nature of
the restriction the double jeopardy clause places on government appeals, for that right had been narrowly limited by
statute. Following enactment of the Act, the Court has been
called upon to delineate the constitutional rather than statutory parameters of the government's right to appeal in criminal
cases.
In a recent case, the Supreme Court ruled that the Government could appeal when a trial judge sets aside a jury's guilty
verdict and enters a judgment of acquittal. United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975). In that case, the Supreme Court
indicated that the Government would be allowed to appeal if
the reversal of the trial court's action would not require another trial, but would merely result in the reinstatement of the
jury's guilty verdict. In a case decided shortly after Wilson,
the Court expressly held that if a successful government appeal
will result in another trial on remand, the double jeopardy
clause would bar an appeal. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S.
358 (1975). In its most recent statement on the subject, the
Court seemed to change its position. In United States v. Sanford, 97 S. Ct. 20 (1976), the Court allowed a government
appeal after the trial judge dismissed the indictment because

CONTINENTAL T.V., INC., A & G SALES, SYLPAC, INC.
and S.A.M. INDUSTRIES, INC. v.
GTE SYLVANIA INCORPORATED
(Docket No. 76-15)
Antitrust-Vertical restraints-Per se illegality under the
Sherman Act of restraints on location resales
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. Decision below: 537 F.2d 980 (1976).
Argument scheduled for the week of February 28, 1977
Analysis prepared January 21, 1977, by Joseph E. Ulrich,

March 21, 1977
Mrh2,17

he concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove its case
at a trial that had ended in a jury deadlock. While this decision
appears to conflict with previous decisions, it was decided
summarily without briefing and argument. The next month,
the Court agreed to hear the Martin Linen Supply case.
This case gives the Court an opportunity to further clarify
the extent to which the double jeopardy clause bars government appeals in criminal actions and to resolve an apparent
conflict in its opinions. If the Court reverses, the result would
further indicate the Burger Court's willingness to broaden
prosecutorial powers and limit the scope of constitutional
guarantees applicable to criminal defendants. If the Court
affirms, this would indicate that the Court has by its other recent decisions drawn the outer limits of the government's right
to appeal in criminal cases, barring appeal where prosecutorial
success will result in another trial.
Arguments
For Petitioner, the United States ofA merica:
1. A verdict of acquittal by a jury, or a judge in a non-jury
trial, is the only absolute bar to a second trial for the same
offense.
2. When a mistrial has been declared after a jury is unable
to reach a verdict, the double jeopardy clause allows the Government to retry the defendant.
3. When a judge assumes the role of factfinder after a jury
deadlock and a mistrial has been declared, his decision to
issue a judgment of acquittal must be subject to review by
appellate courts. If the appeal succeeds, the government's
right to a retrial would merely be reinstated.
For Respondents, Martin Linen Supply Company and Texas
Sanitary Towel Supply Corporation:
1. A -court's judgment of acquittal is an absolute bar to
appeal where a second trial will be required if the Government succeeds.
2. The trial court is entitled to enter a judgment of acquittal
at the close of the government's evidence as well as when the
jury is unable to reach a verdict. An appeal from the former
judgment is barred by the double jeopardy clause; thus it
follows that in the latter situation an appeal should also be
barred.

Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University, Lexington,
VA 24450; telephone (703) 463-9111
Counsel for Petitioners: Lawrence A. Sullivan and Jesse
Chopper, Berkeley, CA, and Glen E. Miller, San Jose, CA;
for Respondent: Richard E. Gugganhime, M. Lawrence Popofsky, Richard L. Goff, and Stephen V. Bomse, San Francisco,
CA
Issue
Whether a restriction by which a manufacturer limits the
locations at which his retailers may resell the manufacturer's

